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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores how, for more than four millennia, neighboring Afghan tribal 
communities have exercised highly decentralized, community-based freshwater 
management practices.  I argue that these practices can act as both a model for how to 
structure Afghan polity at large as well as a global lesson in environmental resource 
management.  The staying-power of these highly decentralized institutions is especially 
confounding for US policymakers because despite enduring nearly three decades of 
unrelenting violent conflict, these community-based freshwater management practices 
have remained a bulwark against “modern” western capitalist expansionism.  These 
management practices are exceptionally resilient because they draw their strength from 
the people-to-people relationships they create and because they place the decision-
making power firmly in the hands of the community.  These time-honored practices are 
under attack by economic intervention from western capitalists and the structural 
adjustment schemes needed for its entrenchment.  Using these community-based 
freshwater management practices as a model for Afghanistan’s political organization at 
large, I recommend ethnofederalism with consociational power sharing at the center 
because it fits Afghanistan’s specific cultural and environmental considerations.  The 
decentralized nature of this strategy also leaves the decision-making power firmly in the 
hands of the tribal communities. 
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Introduction 
 
As I stood on the tarmac of Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, and watched the C-17 
Globemaster meander slowly down the runway toward me, I could not help but notice the 
majestic backdrop before me.  The Hindu Kush Mountains that frame the airfield climb 
more than 19,000 feet into the sky and on that clear morning, their sublime gray mass 
loomed over the entire valley―a sight so awe-inspiring that I almost forgot I was about 
to head home after many months in Afghanistan.  My first trip to Afghanistan did not 
turn out as I had expected.  I arrived flush with excitement and fervor, a young soldier 
itching to destroy anything in his path.  But on that morning, as I waited for my 500,000 
pound taxi home, I was leaving a changed man.  I was mesmerized by the country’s 
splendid landscape and captivated by its generous people.  But my mind was also filled 
with questions of how our involvement might forever change the political landscape of a 
country that had for centuries, vehemently resisted centralization in favor of diffuse local 
governance.  
Water is a fundamental necessity of life and though Afghanistan is a semi-arid 
country that seldom enjoys more than 30mm of rainfall a month, for more than four 
millennia neighboring Afghan tribal communities have exercised highly decentralized, 
community-based freshwater management practices that serve as both models for how to 
structure Afghan polity at large as well as a global lesson in environmental resource 
management (McSweeney et al., 2013).  Since October 2001, United States military 
forces have been continuously deployed to Afghanistan in support of the Global War on 
Terror―a campaign title the Obama administration has since changed to the Overseas 
Contingency Operation.  The War in Afghanistan has claimed nearly 2,300 American 
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lives and the lives of countless Afghans.  Moreover, the conflict has the rather infamous 
distinction of being the longest running war in US history.  For more than three-thousand 
years, foreign nations have had various political and economic interests that have 
compelled them to invade Afghanistan.  From the forces of Alexander the Great in the 
3
rd
-century BCE, through the Soviet invasion in 1979, the Afghan people have often bore 
the high costs of long and drawn-out foreign military campaigns.  More recently, the 
United States has labored vigorously to fashion the Afghan government to better suit its 
own purposes while the Afghan people remain rightfully disillusioned about the agenda 
of their western guests.   
For compelling reasons, Afghanistan is a particularly fascinating case for 
examining both freshwater management and state-building at large.  First, the natural 
environment of Afghanistan is unique and therefore warrants a reasoned and critical 
examination of the influence it has had in shaping its social and political institutions.  
Though the US and Afghan governments have had little success in creating a widespread 
legal umbrella of control over the country today, this should not suggest that those people 
living throughout the countryside, and away from cities like Kabul or Khost, do not have 
considerably complex systems of law.  Albeit informal in structure when compared to 
American political institutions, most of the autonomously functioning tribal councils 
scattered throughout the diverse landscape have been quietly adjudicating legal matters 
amongst its people for millennia. Second, much of the contemporary news and literature 
about Afghanistan―particularly that published in the United States―seldom expand 
beyond analyses of religious extremism which has legitimized the state-building 
paradigm.  To be sure, it is impossible to study Afghanistan without paying particular 
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attention to how Islam informs law and policy or how current US involvement has 
influenced Afghanistan’s political landscape; but it would be a mistake if I did not 
equally incorporate other elements like ethnic studies, economics and cultural history in 
my assessment of the current political landscape.  Third, the relationship between the 
environment and politics constitutes something of a new emphasis in the field of policy 
studies―especially in western comparative political academia.  By examining the way 
the vast majority of Afghanistan’s tribal communities have developed their own formal 
water management strategies―whether in the absence of, or in resistance to―a 
centralized system of institutions, I intend to argue that a decentralized political system 
combined with political power sharing is the best state-building strategy for Afghanistan.  
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, with the advent of the massive troop drawdown 
rapidly approaching, and with the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan currently failing; 
massive changes need to take place if the American-backed Afghan proxy-government 
hopes to reverse the trends of political turmoil now plaguing the country.   
For the purposes of this study, it is critical for the reader to understand that 
Afghans are remarkably dynamic and complex in their social order.  The Afghan people 
have been influenced by centuries of interaction with countries both near and far from its 
geographical borders but they have also managed to maintain strong ethnic and cultural 
ties to their ancestry.  It is also a country with a vibrant and muscular internal 
sociopolitical history of its own.  For most Americans though, the history of Afghanistan 
generally began with the US invasion in 2001.  I have found that many contemporary 
scholars argue that Afghanistan has always lacked stable sociopolitical institutions and 
was never a particularly civilized society.  This presumptive history is why current 
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western scholars and government officials claim that current nation-building efforts have 
yielded lackluster results.  I intend to argue that because all the pre-existing parts―like 
the tribal councils―do not neatly conform to the US-prescribed state-building model, 
policymakers are finding it more difficult to apply the traditional US democratization 
strategy in Afghanistan.  We cannot simply discard the old and replace it with something 
new.  This is precisely why any nation-building effort in Afghanistan will always fail if it 
does not take into account the long and storied sociopolitical history.  Afghan tribal 
community-based water management practices are pristine examples of local-governance 
at work there today and this thesis focuses on their philosophy, form and function as a 
case for ethnofederalism.   
Likewise, what I intend to show is that a deeper investigation into Afghanistan’s 
sociopolitical history yields a much different narrative than that commonly embraced by 
western scholars.  My investigation of Afghanistan suggests that this beautiful country it 
is not simply a ‘Graveyard of Empires’ or a medieval society teeming with 
impressionable youths ripe for Islamic fundamentalist recruitment. What I have found, 
through examining Afghanistan from a more pluralist perspective, is a dynamic nation 
with majestic mountains and fertile plains occupied by people that are struggling with 
some of the very same issues about political power-play and natural resource use that has 
plagued many other nations (including the United States) throughout their own histories.   
Afghanistan is grappling with some of the very same questions about its relationship with 
the natural world as Americans did during the colonial era and continue to do today.  
Conflict over the management of increasingly scarce natural resources like water raises 
challenging questions for environmental policymakers because embedded beneath these 
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conflicts are myriad contrasting political, economic, social and cultural influences.  I will 
argue that ethnofederalism with consociationalism is more likely to succeed in 
Afghanistan than the current approach because it promotes territorial autonomy while 
accommodating the contrasting influences of the tribal communities throughout.   
  
Background 
It is not possible to understand the misfit between US state-building policy and 
Afghan perceptions of US policy without appreciating the context of recent interventions.  
Since 2003, the American war effort in Afghanistan was oft eclipsed by President George 
W. Bush’s wild goose-chase in Iraq. Furthermore, the mission in Afghanistan was never 
clearly defined and thus difficult for American military commanders to determine their 
progress.  In some ways, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan almost completely mirrored 
the Soviet invasion two decades earlier.  Just as the Soviets employed specially trained 
Spetsnaz commandos in their initial combat surge, US involvement came first as a subtle 
trickle of special operations soldiers―mostly backing Afghan Northern Alliance 
troops―directing airstrikes from the ground in an effort to ferret out Osama bin Laden.  
Stationary Taliban targets like buildings were virtually nonexistent and those few that did 
exist were exceedingly difficult to find and destroy without inflicting massive collateral 
damage to the surrounding landscape.  Nevertheless, initial US airstrikes blanketed the 
Afghan countryside with more than 17,000 bombs―including Tomahawk cruise 
missiles, 2,000-pound JDAMS or ‘smart bombs’ and laser-guided 5,000-pound ‘bunker 
buster’ bombs―that indiscriminately killed Taliban, civilians, and ecosystems alike.  In 
November, 2001 the US “began to drop Daisy Cutter bombs, 15,000-pound weapons it 
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had once used to clear landing zones in Indochina’s jungles and which the North 
Vietnamese had protested at the time as ‘weapons of mass destruction’” (Tanner, 2009).  
These ammonium nitrate-fueled bombs and other similar munitions were used in an effort 
to kill Taliban fighters and flush-out Bin Laden who was allegedly hiding in the vast 
network of mountainside caves.  “There was some question about their use because, as 
the US had learned at Okinawa and elsewhere, not only soldiers hid in caves during 
battle” (Tanner, 2009).  US intelligence sources estimated between 3,000 to 4,500 
Afghan civilians were killed during the October 2001 to January 2002 bombing campaign 
(Conetta, 2002).  Soon thereafter, US commanders realized the futility of their Vietnam 
War-era carpet bombing tactics and decided that a boots-on-the-ground strategy was 
better suited for hunting down Bin Laden who was purportedly hiding somewhere in the 
remote and rugged Afghan terrain. 
Then, after nearly a year, and when capturing or killing bin Laden proved to be a 
difficult task, US forces turned their efforts to toppling the Taliban regime―a much more 
straightforward job for the growing masses of US troops on the ground.  Once the 
Taliban were quickly dispatched―a job that by all accounts, took Northern Alliance and 
coalition forces about two months―the US government realized they had completely 
decimated Afghanistan's stable central government; albeit an oppressive and extremist 
regime, but a stable one nonetheless.  Therefore, the job turned to government building, 
then economy building and consequently the US found itself engaged in an all out nation 
building effort that has since spiraled out of control. 
   
Chapter One 
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 We were going to have to bomb them up to the Stone Age 
―Quote from an unnamed Clinton administration official, The New York Times, 
September 19, 2001 
 
In his book, A Perfect Failure (2012) John L. Cook, a retired US Army 
Lieutenant Colonel and former senior advisor to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (and one 
of the architects of the Phoenix Program; a search-and-destroy campaign employed 
during the Vietnam War
1) lamented that Afghanistan is a “drab, dirty, ugly, exhausted 
[…] failed third-world country”.  Additionally, when prompted by reporters about the 
planning of past bombing operations in Afghanistan, particularly in response to the 1993 
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, an official in the Clinton 
administration commented that “[w]hen we looked at Afghanistan before, the sense was 
we were going to bomb them up to the Stone Age,” (Gordon et al., 2001, emphasis 
added).  On the one hand, many American scholars and statesmen argue that Afghanistan 
has never been a particularly ‘civilized’ place, but on the other, history reveals a much 
different narrative of Afghanistan.  As we will see, Afghan tribal communities have 
remarkably sophisticated legal systems, environmentally sustainable practices for 
managing freshwater resources and maintain extraordinarily strong connections to their 
ethnic and cultural lineages.  Furthermore, Afghans have been involved in global 
economic markets for more than three centuries.  History tells us that Afghanistan was 
actually the epicenter of trade and commerce, where for more than 3,000 years, 
                                                          
1 For more on the Phoenix Program see, Ashes to ashes: The Phoenix program and the Vietnam War 
(1990), by Dale Andrad 
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“[v]aluable merchandise from China, India, Persia, Mesopotamia, Central Asia and the 
Mediterranean […] would pass through Afghan territory (Rashid et al., 2012).   
It is not surprising however, that many contemporary American scholars and 
statesmen continue to view Afghan tribal life as ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilized’.  “We 
[Americans] have inherited a somewhat fuzzy [and derogatory] usage of the term ‘tribe’ 
and ‘tribal’ from early British anthropology [which defines tribal peoples or tribes as] 
‘underdeveloped’ (formerly called ‘primitive’ or even ‘savage’) minorities, far from the 
majorities’ cultural and social mainstream” (Glatzer, 2002).  In his most influential work, 
Primitive Culture (1871), the father of cultural anthropology, Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, 
described culture as the “complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, 
law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
society.”  Americans have often thought our job to civilize the ‘natives’ and though US 
foreign policy experts have had little success in implementing a strategy for political 
assimilation of the tribes, this should not suggest that those tribal peoples living 
throughout the countryside are uncultured, uncivilized and lawless.  However, the 
prevailing western notion about the Afghan culture, and certainly that which dominates 
contemporary American perception, suggests that the Afghan culture is one informed by 
religious theology rather than a culture derived from myriad interconnected elements of 
which religion is but one part.  It is particularly important to note that Afghan culture 
cannot be generalized and framed within nice tidy boundaries.  Likewise, Afghan cultural 
studies becomes remarkably more complex when we see that Afghanistan is home to 
multiple cultures and those cultures can be further subdivided according to varied, yet 
distinct, linguistic associations and ethnic lineages.  Moreover, the topic becomes 
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increasingly muddied “by the various groupings to which we attach the label 
‘ethnic’―extending from the level of subtribes, to tribes, to the larger and socially more 
heterogeneous linguistic communities―[that] are currently undergoing significant 
changes themselves” (Banuazizi and Weiner, 1986).  It is no wonder then that in his 
book, Keywords (1983), Raymond Williams described “culture as one of the two or three 
most complicated words in the English language”.  
Similarly to the US, Afghanistan is populated by a variety of distinct ethnic and 
linguistic groups, each with their own unique and prolific cultural histories, however (and 
extremely important to remember within the larger framework of this study), America is 
overwhelmingly composed of recent migrants (and immigrants); and by contrast, 
Afghanistan contains multiple ‘homeland peoples’.  “Afghanistan, particularly rural 
Afghanistan, provides an excellent example of a place where tribal and ethnic groups take 
primacy over the individual” (Barfield, 2010).  Loyalty is generally traced to kin, village, 
tribe, or ethnic group (qawnz).  The largest of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups is the 
Pashtuns, followed in general descending order (in numbers) by the Tajiks, Hazaras, 
Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Aimaks, “although a number of smaller ethnic groups have 
regionally important roles (most notably the Nuristanis and Baluchis)” (Barfield, 2010). 
The land nestled between the Hari Rud and the Amu rivers has played a role in 
influencing the complexity of Afghanistan’s population dispersion over time.  
Afghanistan boasts one of the most sublime and majestic natural environments on earth 
and one of the most rugged.  The character of the landscape has had as much to do with 
shaping the cultural history of its people as it did in influencing where the people have 
built their communities.  On the one hand, what we see today in the diversity of Afghan 
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cultures and the diffuse yet strategic arrangement of their communities has much to do 
with topography.  But on the other hand, internal customs and values have further 
structured how Afghans engage with each other and neighboring states.  The landscape 
and climate have significantly determined where tribal communities have sprouted and 
their cultures and way-of-life have been overwhelmingly influenced by the bounty (or 
lack thereof) of the land on which they live.  Current scholarship suggests that the 
mountainous façade of Afghanistan has created a series of political, technological and 
ethnic divides between Afghanistan’s many tribal communities.  Renowned 
anthropologist Robert Canfield (1973) suggested that “where the localized interests of 
groups divide, cultural boundaries form because the groups tend to express their different 
interests in culturally contrastive terms.  Their social distinctions thus develop spatially in 
respect to their accessibility.” Afghans have organized themselves based upon ethnicity 
(see Table 1) with the highest population density clusters found in and around cities like 
Kabul, which is nestled in the fertile valley below the Hindu Kush.   
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Table 1: Afghan Ethnic Groups by Region and Percent Population 
 
The Hindu Kush Mountains (the name Hindu Kush, when translated from Persian, 
pays homage to the Indian slaves who died en masse as they were transported over the 
range en route to Central Asia during the 14
th
-century) run from the north-east to the 
south-west and  reach heights of more than 19,000 feet.  The Hindu Kush remain snow-
covered for more than half the year and navigating the overland passes―numbering 
scarcely more than a dozen―constitutes an extremely arduous undertaking in the winter 
months. To the east on the modern Pakistani border, lie the Suleiman Mountains, where 
Pashtun tribes can be found in the highest numbers.  Like the Hindu Kush, the Suleiman 
boast a rugged and snow-covered façade but aside from their geological importance as 
the natural border separating the two nations, the peaks of the Suleiman embody cultural 
significance to many Pashtuns.  According to Pashtun legend, Qais Abdur Rashid―the 
father of the Pashtun people―is buried somewhere in the Suleiman Mountains.  The 
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legend contends that “Rashid had once travelled to Mecca, and had converted to Islam 
under the direct instruction of the Prophet Muhammad” (Rashid et al., 2012).  As such, 
many Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns living nearby make a spring pilgrimage to the 
Suleiman to pay their respects―in the form of prayer and animal sacrifice―to their most 
recent common cultural ancestor.  The Pashtuns can be considered a transborder ethnic 
group―ignoring the Durand line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Likewise most 
Pashtuns do not classify themselves as Afghan, Pakistani, or any amalgam in between.  
Rather, most move freely back and forth across the border as members of an assortment 
of Pashtun tribes.
2
  Similarly, the Turkoman and Baluchi ethnic groups share lineages 
with communities in Iran, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and Iran and Pakistan 
respectively and so too move freely across international borders, choosing to align 
themselves with their respective ethnic groups as opposed to classifying themselves as 
members of an Afghan, Pakistani or Iranian nation.  On the aggregate, the relative 
distribution of the population is diffuse with many tribal communities having thrived for 
millennia in the fertile valleys, the steppe, as well as in the mountainous regions.  It 
should be noted that the natural shifts in topography—from valley to highland to 
mountain and the natural barriers they create—generally coincide with divisions in 
ethnicity (see Figure 1).   
          Each community (which is generally comprised of multiple tribal villages sharing 
ethnic and genealogical ties) has figured out how to optimize the use of the natural 
resources in their respective environment and organized their social hierarchy to manage 
the use of those resources in a manner to best suit the needs of the community.  Though 
                                                          
2
 For more on the Durand line, see Bijan Omrani (2009) The Durand line: History and problems of the 
Afghan-Pakistan border 
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some Afghans are pastoralists, the majority (more than eighty percent) of the population 
is agrarian and I will therefore focus my case study analysis on the social organizational 
structure of these agrarian tribal communities in relation to water sources.   
Afghans have further organized themselves around watersheds, where they have 
learned to optimize the use of the natural resources through an intricate social 
organization: the community-based water management institution.  Afghans have enjoyed 
a highly decentralized arrangement of water management that has operated for more than 
4,500 years, thanks to leadership from local members of the community.   
 
Figure 1: Ethnicity distribution 
Heretofore, significant numbers of Afghans hailing from all ethnic groups have 
fled across the borders to refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan to escape conflict with the 
Soviets (1979-89), the Taliban (1990-2001), or the Americans (2001-present).  Conflict 
therefore has dispersed the locality of some tribal communities, who were then forced to 
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form new social and local relationships.  Regardless of locale however, most Afghans 
retain strong cultural ties to their ancestral place of origin or “home area” (watan) 
(Glatzer, 2001).  According to a study by Stanford University, Afghanistan has the most 
cultural fractionalization and the highest rate of ethnic diversity in the region (Fearon, 
2003). 
Like many Americans (in the past), Afghans claim distinct ancestral lineages.  In 
contemporary usage in the United States, many have grown accustomed to identifying 
themselves as decedents of a racial or ethnic lineage―African American, Asian 
American, Hispanic American, etc.  A person who identifies themselves as Hispanic 
American may wish to communicate that their ancestral lineage or ethnicity is that from a 
country boasting Latin American or Spanish-speaking origins; like Puerto Rico, the 
Dominican Republic, or Mexico to name but three.  Furthermore, a Hispanic American 
may delineate their ethnic ancestry further by referring to themselves as Mexican 
American.  Nevertheless, the common theme throughout is obviously the inclusion of the 
American cultural identifier.  Despite the country of origin to which their family, 
extended family, or ancestors hailed, a person calling themselves Mexican American 
probably wishes to be subdivided and identified as someone with distinct Mexican 
cultural ties but also as a contiguous member of the broader American culture.  This 
cultural phenomenon of the premeditated association by distinct ethnic and/or linguistic 
groups under a larger umbrella culture is not necessarily present in Afghanistan.  
Americans either have a single national identity with or without an additional ethnic 
identity or a hybrid heritage.  It is not clear that ‘Afghans’ have a national identity.    
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In Afghanistan, you will not hear someone identify themselves as a Pashtun 
Afghan, a Tajik Afghan, or a Baluchi Afghan.  There are Pashtuns, Tajiks, Baluchis, etc.  
Furthermore, Afghans often further delineate their qawn by region, village, or tribe: 
Durrani, Badakhshi, or Kabuli (as a person hailing from the city of Kabul).  The purpose 
of this discussion was to show that nation building—in a deeply divided place where the 
people do not readily identify themselves as part of the larger national culture—presents 
a set of exceedingly difficult cultural considerations.  For the purposes of this study, it is 
critical to understand that the people living in Afghanistan today are a people that have 
experienced centuries of interaction with other societies and do not simply constitute a 
medieval society teeming with impressionable youths ripe for Islamic fundamentalist 
recruitment.  Afghan culture has not been static in its evolution over time yet most tribal 
communities have retained much of their ethnic and linguistic ties. 
Historically speaking, most Afghan tribal communities have lived in relative 
peace with one another (the reign of the Taliban in the 1990s notwithstanding).  
However, casting the history between tribal communities as wholly peaceful would be 
misleading because warlords have often battled over land appropriation and territorial 
disputes (particularly since 1992, when the opium poppy became the main cash crop).  
Indeed most of the literature on internal ethnic violence in Afghanistan can be shortly 
traced back to the rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s and was comprised mostly of 
ethnic Pashtun Taliban attacks against Hazaras Shi’a Muslims.  In fact, predominant 
literature on the history of Afghanistan paints a much different picture of ethnic relations 
than what occurred in the Taliban-ruled 90s or what US strategists feared would result in 
post-9/11 Afghanistan.  Though divided by ethnic affiliations, tribal politics, natural land 
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barriers or a combination of all three, tribal warriors often banned together when Afghan 
territorial autonomy was threatened—as it was during the plights of Alexander the Great 
in the 3
rd
-century BCE (who barely made it out alive when he was struck by an Afghan 
arrow during an ambush), a hat trick of failed British attempts (1839-42, 1878-81 and 
1917) and the Soviets (1979-89).  Violent conflicts in these cases were targeted against, 
and in response to, foreign forces.  It is particularly important to note that many times 
during Afghan history, foreign invaders endured raucous attacks as they marched their 
way across the region at the hands of the tribal peoples living in the mountainous regions.  
Though attacks were common, they were independently led and coordinated by each 
individual tribe and were not part of a comprehensive nationwide Afghan rebellion led by 
a central government.  Renowned contemporary Afghan poet and former president of the 
UN General Assembly, Abd al-Rahman Pazhwak (1919-95) wrote his most famous work, 
Marden-e Parupamizad about this very theme.  Marden-e Parupamizad, a recounting of 
Alexander the Great’s exploits in Afghanistan (known as Ariana at the time), is a 
remarkably vibrant (and relevant piece today) describing renowned Afghan patriotism: 
Thousands of wine-filled barrels fail to intoxicate a patriot 
So much as a tiny particle of the homeland’s dust 
It is therefore not surprising that Afghans from most ethnic and linguistic groups have 
once again chosen to take up arms against the US-led coalition forces.  Furthermore, 
current literature suggests that a people with a history of conflict (either with each other 
or against foreign forces on their domestic soil), are more likely to resort to conflict when 
compared to peoples lacking such a conflict-laden history (Cedarman et al., 2013).             
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Chapter Two 
You can’t fit a square peg into a round hole 
The current state-building strategy being employed by US policymakers in 
Afghanistan is failing.  Corruption abounds in Hamid Karzai’s administration―an 
illegitimately installed puppet regime comprised mostly of his friends and family who 
have a penchant for plundering instead of rebuilding.  Taliban attacks on Afghan 
government employees have increased with decisive regularity and with often deadly 
results.  While top US commanders insist Afghan forces are shouldering more of the 
‘work load’, the casualty numbers for both Afghans and their American counterparts 
continue to mount.
3
  Already the world’s leader in opium production, accounting for 
more than seventy-five percent of the world’s heroin supply, Afghan warlords have 
enjoyed three straight years of increased cultivation.  Moreover, Afghan civilians from all 
tribal, ethnic and linguistic groups are rightfully disillusioned and cynical about the gains 
their western guests keep promising.  Over the last thirteen years, answering the question 
of how to unite the people of Afghanistan under a single political institution has left 
academics, political analysts and presidents scratching their heads.  The ever-elusive 
‘peaceful democracy’ in Afghanistan is rather more a question of the incompatibility of 
the long trusted US democratization model—employed with oft touted but altogether 
uninspiring results for the domestic citizens in a host of countries, such as the Philippines 
(1899-1902), post-WWII Germany, Vietnam (1965-1975), and most recently in Iraq 
(2003-2010).  Furthermore, I argue that there is an incompatibility between the 
                                                          
3
 See Shah and Nordland (October 6, 2013) Bomb kills 4 soldiers in Afghanistan, The New York Times.  At 
the time this was written, US and coalition forces had just incurred the worst loss of life from a single 
combat incursion in almost six months.   
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fundamental tenants of western consumer capitalism—which theoretically needs a 
centralized authoritarian-style government—and the predisposition for political 
decentralization in a people that have been historically autonomy-seeking.  This is why a 
decentralized Afghan government is antithetical to US policy, but better suited for the 
ethnically diverse and geographically diffuse tribal communities of Afghanistan.  
Certainly history suggests that Afghanistan has always been involved in global markets 
but this is more about their dogged resistance to the fundamental principle of consumer 
capitalism—the principle that the terms of market transactions be dictated to them by 
neoliberal capitalist outsiders.  We need to examine why the US-led democratization 
strategy is failing in Afghanistan but to answer the why; we must take a closer look at 
some of the successes and failures of the model America has employed throughout its 
nation-building history. 
For nearly the last one hundred years, centripetalism has arguably been the 
preferred model of western, American policymakers, for the successful application of 
post-conflict peace-building strategies in ethnically diverse places (see the work of 
prominent centripetal scholar Donald Horowitz).  As its most fundamental tenants, 
centripetalism endorses “core democratic institutions such as political parties, electoral 
systems, and cabinet governments, and [promotes] the territorial division of state powers 
via federalism”, as the way to foster political accommodation among multiethnic groups 
(Wolff and Yakinthou, 2011).  Moreover, centripetalism encourages “convergence” 
towards the center and “often condemn[s] proportional representation” (O’Leary, 2013).  
The overriding feature of centripetalism (especially in democratic federalist states), and 
what I argue is the main reason for its failure in Afghanistan, is the unabashed and 
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unwavering allegiance—particularly by American scholars and statesmen—to 
nationalism (E pluribus Unum).  By promoting ethnic and cultural assimilation—the 
proverbial Melting Pot—this type of state-building ignores the problem of how power 
inequality can mire relations once in the cauldron.  Furthermore, this type of convergence 
of cultures in state-building, in addition to creating further ethnic divides in places like 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and despite its proponents’ claims and best intentions, is also 
particularly well suited for inaugurating a powerful political monopoly that can be 
enjoyed by the majority while leaving the minority powerless and alienated.  “That 
democracy might lead to domination was the theme of ‘tyranny by the majority’, which 
deeply concerned eighteenth-century republicans, such as James Madison, and 
nineteenth-century liberals, such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill” 
(O’Leary, 2012).  Under even the most ideal of circumstances however, (i.e. a relatively 
homogeneous culture boasting a high rate of literacy, abundant natural resources and 
without the burden of three-decades of near unrelenting violent conflict) a state-building 
strategy of this type can only hope to enjoy marginal success at best.   
The Philippine islands were essentially the first official ‘successful’ test subject in 
America’s imperialist experiment abroad (Matthew Perry’s short-lived lackluster foray to 
Japan in the 1850s notwithstanding).  “Wrested from Spanish control by American 
military forces and local revolutionaries, the Philippines included more than seven 
thousand islands inhabited by more than seven million people, eight thousand miles from 
Washington, D.C.” (Suri, 2011).  Some academics argue that US involvement in the 
Philippines was prompted by warmongering “jingoes” who feared they had lost touch 
with their rightful heritage of manliness that was so heroically embodied by their Civil 
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War forefathers and the only way to recapture it from the gentle clutches of masculine 
degeneracy that plagued politics at the time was through a good old fashioned war (See 
Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood, 2001).  A more likely and pragmatic 
explanation however, is the fact that the Philippines were less than two-thousand miles 
from mainland China—a veritable burgeoning economic market that had American 
military-neomercantilists and trade entrepreneurs alike, licking their lips.  Despite the 
arguments over the motivation for military action, it can be agreed that the US sought to 
establish a modern, “sovereign, unified, self-governing, and sustainable Philippine state, 
serving a united Filipino people” (Suri, 2011).  The model for fashioning the Philippines 
into America’s likeness was based on the theory that a well-ordered and peaceful 
democracy would result after the installation of a strong centralized government that 
divided its power between political institutions to which the most dominant ethnic or 
cultural group(s) would have access.  President’s McKinley and then Roosevelt were 
paternalistic and belittling in their assessment of Filipinos as “rudimentary” in their 
ability to self-govern and also deprecating by choosing to cast Filipinos as “savage” and 
their homeland a “howling wilderness” (Hoganson, 2001).  In fact, Roosevelt was so 
confounded by the wide array of ethnic and cultural diversity encountered by US troops 
on the Philippine islands that he lamented that they [Filipinos] were a population of “half 
caste and native Christian, war-like Moslems, and wild pagans” (Hanson, 2003).  To be 
sure, the people living on the Philippine islands were remarkably diverse.  But in 
choosing to disregard the vibrant array of Filipino diversity, in favor of a centralized 
polity that promoted ethnic transcendence, the US military encountered fervent 
opposition from guerilla forces and became embroiled in a fierce three year war that 
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resulted in at least 4,200 American deaths and more than a million Filipino casualties 
(Hanson, 2003). 
More recently, the US took centripetalism and applied it to Iraq.  By the end of 
2006, Saddam Hussein was hanging in the gallows and his Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party 
had been all but bastardized, leaving the country in a state of political disarray and long-
lasting bitter conflict.  Heretofore, the second largest Iraqi ethnic group (the Kurds with 
around seventeen percent of the total country population) had been seeking independence 
from the dominant ethnic group, the Iraqi Arabs, which comprised more than seventy-
five percent of the total population.  Saddam’s well documented widespread violations of 
human rights against the Kurds lasted almost three decades and manifested itself in 
expulsions, forced ‘nationality correction,’ horrific torture, rape and chemical warfare 
attacks.  Moreover, the two dominant Muslim groups, Sunni (Kurds are mostly Sunni) 
and Shi'a (made up of mostly Arabs,) though having a history of cooperation dating back 
to the 1920 rebellion against the British Mandate for Mesopotamia, saw an increase in 
inter-sectarian conflict in post-2003 Iraq.  The American-led Coalition Provisional 
Authority decided that the best way to quell violence and close ethnic and sectarian 
divisions was to promote a unified Iraqi national identity by dividing political power 
amongst the Sunnis, Shi'a and Kurds while pushing for a strong centralized democratic 
republic.  Under the direction of Paul Bremer, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
nominated Sunni Arab Adnan al-Pachachi as the first president to lead what was to be the 
Republic of Iraq.  However, Jala Talabani, a Kurd, emerged from 2005 elections and 
inter-party negotiations, as the first Iraqi president of the new republic.  Despite their 
efforts, 2006 and 2007 were to be the deadliest two years since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.               
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Some may argue that the United States is a shining example of centripetalism’s 
potential.  But lest we forget that the American Civil War took four bloody years and cost 
more than 620,000 American lives—an unprecedented macabre of “[m]en thrown by the 
hundreds into burial trenches; soldiers stripped of every identifying object before being 
abandoned on the field; bloated corpses hurried into hastily dug graves; nameless victims 
of dysentery or typhoid interred beside military hospitals; men blown to pieces by 
artillery shells; bodies hidden by woods or ravines, left to the depredations of hogs or 
wolves or time”.4  Not to mention the irreparable emotional damage that haunted the 
survived loved ones who struggled to “understand their sacrifice of kin and friends”.5  
Interestingly enough, some argue that it was the Civil War which “generated a profound 
fear of sectionalism, which has arguably made US political scientists into unconscious 
heirs of Lincoln when asked to think about pluri-national federations” (McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2009).    
Obviously, degeneration into civil war is not favored by US foreign policy 
experts, however; centralization, even in the absence of consent, is championed for its 
usefulness in Afghanistan even though the same approach yielded lackluster results in 
Iraq.  As the first step in America’s democratization strategy in Afghanistan, Karzai (a 
Pashtun) was initially ‘selected’ to chair the interim Afghan administration in late 2001.  
Soon thereafter, he was then again ‘selected’ by the loya jerga as interim president, a 
position he officially procured after elections in 2004, amid widespread claims of 
                                                          
4
 Faust, Drew Gilpin (2008-01-08). This Republic of Suffering (Kindle Locations 1679-1682). Knopf 
Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. 
5
 Blight, David W. (2002-03-01). Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (p. 72). Harvard 
University Press - A. Kindle Edition.   
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fraudulent voting, “particularly, ballot-box stuffing” and Karzai’s own backroom 
dealings with the other candidates (Gall, 2004).  
 
Chapter Three 
So that you may make a garden & prairie from this desolate desert 
–Excerpt from, Instead of Hate, May Love Rain Down, written by Afghan poet, Alaha 
Ahrar, 2010 
 
What type of state-building strategy is suited for a place boasting high ethnic 
diversity, four centuries of local policy management and a history peppered with near 
incessant intervention from foreign powers? At this point I want to stress that 
centripetalism is not always the worst method for state-building.  It is however, not the 
appropriate methodology for Afghanistan.  Furthermore, ethnofederalism is not always 
the go-to solution for state-building in all multiethnic and deeply divided places; 
however, it is, as I will argue, the most feasible state-building strategy for use in 
Afghanistan.  Likewise, it is also important to consider the notions of power; especially 
power division versus power sharing and the implications of each when coupled with 
ethnofederalism.   
To begin, ethnofederalism (also known as pluri-nationalism) is defined as a 
“federal political system in which component territorial governance units are invested 
with ethnic content” (Hale, 2008).  More precisely, ethnofederalism grants all parties 
(regardless of size) significant political decision-making autonomy.  Over the last two 
decades, state-building strategies that combine ethnofederalism with power sharing and 
consociationalism at the center have bred widespread dissent amongst scholars and 
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statesmen. Some scholars would suggest that the best models should favor ethnic 
dominance over ethnic autonomy, power division over power sharing, or partition in 
cases of irresolvable conflict.  Moreover, Deiwiks (2009) argues that “ethnofederal states 
[run the risk] for secession [because] ethnic groups have their own latent state, which 
arguably gives them reason and opportunity to eventually fight for secession”.  The 
arguments against ethnofederalism from Deiwiks and others could be a case of the old 
post-Civil War fear of sectionalism.  Moreover, the critics of ethnofederalism might be 
entrenched in their views when they look at the failures of ethnofederation-like states in 
Africa (see Kenya and Uganda), Asia (see Pakistan and the secession of Bangladesh) and 
Europe (see Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, to name but two).  On the surface, these 
examples do not showcase an exemplary track record for ethnofederalism.  However, by 
comparison, American centripetalism boasts a similar success rate (see the arguments 
above).  So the question then arises about the usefulness of ethnofederalism.   
McGarry and O'Leary (2009) contend that regional autonomy combined with 
“ethnic inclusion [in government power sharing] at the center” is the best way to ensure 
that each party is afforded an equal amount of political decision-making power while 
maintaining their own territorial autonomy.  Furthermore, I argue that the applicability of 
ethnofederalism with consociationalism must be contextual on a case-by-case basis and is 
furthermore, particularly useful in cases where aggressive forms of centripetalism have 
failed.  Ethnofederalism is nearly the antithesis of centripetalism; however, there are a 
variety of amalgamations in between.  At this point, a brief explanation of these 
intermediate stages is in order so that we can understand why ethnofederalism is the best 
solution for Afghanistan. 
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Figure 2: Power sharing stages and the various steps of decentralization  
 Figure 2 illustrates how power sharing and various steps of decentralization 
impact the autonomy of people in multiethnic/multicultural places.  The smallest circle 
(centripetalism) which I described earlier, endorses ethnic and cultural assimilation as a 
way to promote homogeneous, centralized and unilateral political decision making.  As 
we move outward from the center, the concentric circles become larger because each 
stage allows a larger degree of multiethnic/multicultural inclusion and more evenly 
distributes power sharing respectively.  As we move further outward from centripetalism, 
parties need compromise their multiethnic/multicultural diversity less (regardless of the 
size of their party) as a prerequisite for inclusion in the political decision-making and are 
increasingly afforded a more equal ‘share’ of the decision-making power.  At the 
periphery (territorial pluralism), communities are neither required to relinquish their 
territorial autonomy nor their multiethnic/multicultural diversity.  Furthermore, power 
sharing is equally distributed regardless of party size, promoting a high degree of 
multilateral political decision making.      
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 The results of comprehensive centralization (including the management of 
natural resources and the environment) raises challenging questions for scholars and 
statesmen alike―especially when considering deeply divided multiethnic places.  
Research suggests that people who have historically enjoyed decentralized, community-
based political decision-making are more likely to resist intrusion in the form of capitalist 
expansion and the structural adjustment it requires, especially in cases where conflict has 
previously occurred (see Cedarman et al., 2013).  Research suggests that Afghans are not 
the only people in environmental history to resist the commoditization of their natural 
resources.  Nor are they the lone case study of dissent against centripetalism in 
international political history.  A brief look into the not-so-distant past at other places 
around the globe yields rather poignant comparative case studies of how “neoliberal 
economic [and political] restructuring reach[ed] into the very heart of communities, [and] 
enrich[ed] the few while impoverish[ed] the many” (Collier, 2005).   
Few scholars or policy analysts have not heard of the Zapatista rebellion in the 
Chiapas (1994-present).  “The Zapatista rebellion inspired enormous sympathy from 
people throughout the world who read about the uprising in the newspapers or watched 
reports about it on television” (Collier, 2005).  In January, 1994, the day NAFTA took 
effect, Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), 
embarked on a nearly two decade-long revolution against the maltreatment of the people 
in Chiapas and government-mandated land reform in the region (led largely by the 
Mexican government’s desire for the ‘modernization’ that could be achieved through oil 
development).  “Chiapas was the Mexican state that had the highest indices of poverty 
and the fewest social services” (Collier, 2005).  Much like Afghanistan, Chiapas is 
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considered ethnically and culturally diverse; Chiapas being principally populated by 
many Mayan Indian tribes such as the Tsotzil, Tzeltal and the Tojobal (Vargas, 1994).  
Predominantly agrarian, “some peasants in Chiapas [were] able to weather the changes 
wrought by Mexico’s economic restructuring by diversifying their farming activities, 
becoming produce and flower merchants, or starting up transport businesses.  But many 
[could] not” (Collier, 2005).  On behalf of the people in Chiapas, the EZLN advocated a 
‘bottom-up’ approach to politics (as opposed to ‘top-down’) and resisted economic 
globalization and the impacts it had on local autonomy.  The initial rebellion constituted 
“Mexico’s most serious armed insurgency movement” since the early 1970s (Vargas, 
1994).  Much like the people of Chiapas, many Afghan tribal communities are currently 
resisting economic intervention from western capitalists and the structural adjustment 
schemes needed for its entrenchment.  Within the context of this study, there are two 
profound similarities and one major difference between the people of Chiapas and the 
Afghan tribal communities.  First, prior to outside intervention, both the people of 
Chiapas and Afghans enjoyed relative decision-making autonomy.  Second, both the 
Chiapas state and Afghanistan as a whole are remarkable case studies in ethnic and 
cultural diversity.  But perhaps most compelling when compared to the people of 
Chiapas, tribal Afghans have the extraordinary ability to wage war on their own behalf 
and the profound perseverance to endure the hardships as a result―a fact which has 
plagued the US forces and their coalition friends over the last thirteen years.       
I have argued that ethnofederalism is contextually a good fit for Afghanistan.  
Likewise, decision-making power in politics is an exemplary lens through which to 
analyze the usefulness of state-building strategies (particularly ethnofederalism) in deeply 
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divided multiethnic places.  Similarly to ethnofederalism, consociationalism, as one form 
of power sharing, has drawn considerable criticisms from prominent scholars (see the 
arguments of Donald Horowitz and Paul Brass).  While “the biggest stick with which 
consociationalists are beaten is the suggestion that they are not democratic […] such 
critics reason [that consociation] reinforces the presumed sources of conflict” (O’Leary, 
2005).  In contrast however, advocates of consociationalism argue that “certain collective 
identities, especially those based upon nationality, ethnicity, language, and religion, are 
generally fairly durable once formed” and that such durable identities “―can be, and 
often are, mobilized in a politics of antagonism, perhaps especially during the 
democratization of political systems” (O’Leary, 2005).  Simply put, blood is thicker than 
water.  Consociationalism then, as a viable form of power sharing in multiethnic places 
(like Afghanistan), can “provid[e] autonomy for communities and facili[tate] sensible 
intercommunity cooperation” (O’Leary, 2005).  There are generally five practices 
involved with consociation-type power sharing: 
1. Granting territorial autonomy and creating confederal arrangements 
2. Creating a polycommunal, or ethnic, federation 
3. Adopting group proportional representation in administrative appointments, 
including consensus decision rules in the executive. 
4.  Adopting a highly proportional electoral system in a parliamentary 
framework. 
5. Acknowledging group rights or corporate (nonterritorial) federalism (Sisk, 
1996).  
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Afghan tribal communities have placed their confidence in the tribal council—
which have existed for centuries and draw much of their influence from ancient tradition 
and/or the tenants of Islam—and exhibit a great deal of conflict-resolving power and 
trustworthiness among the people.  Albeit informal in structure and procedure when 
compared to American political institutions, most of the autonomously functioning tribal 
councils (and in some cases one or two village elders) scattered throughout the country 
have been quietly adjudicating legal issues amongst its people for millennia.  Frequent 
disruption of the central government over the last century (and more recently leading up 
to and including the US invasion) has further crystallized the tribal councils, elevating 
them to one of the most trusted and powerful components of Afghan customary law and 
politics.  The foundation for an ethnofederalist-type structure (the tribal council) is 
already firmly entrenched in Afghanistan and has been so for many centuries.                     
Moreover, when considering power sharing solutions like consociationalism, it is 
equally important to note that “theorists contrast power to and the power over”; where 
“power to is ability and power over is domination (O’Leary, 2012, emphasis added).  
Similarly, power over arrangements almost always lead to a “power monopoly” by the 
person, party or group wielding it (O’Leary, 2012).  Power monopolies are commonly 
exhibited in monarchies (this type of government existed in Afghanistan from 1709-1973 
and included a variety of dynasties).  Power monopolies, or power over arrangements, 
imply that there will be a winner and a loser, though there is no perceivable way to 
allocate the equitable distribution of the losses while the winnings are solely enjoyed by 
the ruling person, class or party.  In stark contrast, power to relationships imply that the 
involved parties share the power with all other parties and have the authority to either 
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advocate for their party or defend rights.  “Power sharing practices […] often evolve in 
direct response to a history of violent conflict” (Sisk, 1996).  However, scholars suggest 
that the precise implementation of power sharing must be both timely and inclusionary.  
As Sisk suggested, “determining when [to implement] a power sharing solution is at best 
a difficult judgment call requiring intimate knowledge of the situation, especially of the 
true disposition of the parties and their willingness to live together with a common or 
shared political framework”.   
There is one caveat to this entire framework.  Most studies on the use of 
ethnofederalism and power sharing solutions like consociationalism have been focused 
on places deeply divided by internal ethnic conflict (see Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Yugoslavia/Kosovo, Bosnia or Iraq for similar arguments), while historically speaking, 
most Afghan tribal communities have lived in relative peace with one another (again, the 
reign of the Taliban in the 1990s notwithstanding).  However, current literature suggests 
that  territorial autonomy-granting solutions (like ethnofederalism) with full inclusion of 
power sharing at the center (i.e., consociationalism) may be a viable solution in highly 
divided ethnically diverse places both with and without a history of conflict (Cedarman et 
al., 2013).   
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Chapter Four 
Still waters run deep 
 
Figure 3: Afghan farmers digging irrigation canals (Photo courtesy of USAID photographer, Ben Barber, 2005) 
Water is a common-use resource and therefore, traditional management models 
used by developed nations regularly focus on centralized, county and state public works 
authorities for equitable distribution and objective oversight.  Despite the prevalence of 
this dominant model in the US, conflict abounds over water management.  Even in the 
absence of violent conflict, water management has sparked vivid controversy throughout 
US environmental history, most notably with the Colorado River and the Catskill 
Mountains.
6
  In the absence of or in defiance to a centralized water management 
                                                          
6
 See Soll (2013) Empire of water, for a complete history of the problems that arose out of the water 
management proposal in the Catskill Mountains for the purposes of supplying New York City.  
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institution, Afghan community-based freshwater management ‘institutions’ have been 
used with remarkable effectiveness and can be traced back 4,500 years to an “ancient 
settlement near Kandahar” (Qureshi, 2002).  The staying-power of these highly 
decentralized practices is especially confounding for US policymakers because despite 
enduring nearly three decades of unrelenting violent conflict―the Soviet-Afghan War 
(1979-89), the Afghan Civil War (1992-01), and the current US-led conflict (2001-
present)―community-based social water management practices have remained relatively 
unhampered (for a similar argument see Lee, 2006).  “Their prevalence largely result[ed] 
from widespread availability of both water resources from rivers and streams as well as 
adjacent land suitable for development, usually along river terraces and alluvial plains” 
(Rout, 2008).  While certainly it can be argued that the advent of the massive drought 
(1998-2004) indeed required some alterations in the community water management 
approach, domestic agricultural production (including opium, which is generally 
considered a water-hungry plant) only moderately declined during those water-starved 
years.  Moreover, the success of local freshwater management practices are particularly 
astonishing because current research shows that Afghans generally access only the most 
shallow surface water despite boasting massive groundwater reserves at an estimated 
twenty billion cubic meters (BCM) (Qureshi, 2002). 
Afghans are predominantly agrarian while some substitute their farming with 
animal husbandry.  Despite the lack of usable farm land however―less than 13% 
country-wide―more than eighty percent of Afghans rely on agriculture as their primary 
source of income.  Moreover, eighty percent of the Afghan population lives in the rural 
areas far removed from cities like Kabul or Kandahar.  Topography informs land use and 
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land use directly impacts lifestyle.  As such, the people living in these agricultural regions 
are generally sedentary, making a living off of the land.  They have stationary homes 
built with earthen materials and survive through the harsh winter months on the fruits of 
their growing season labors.   
  Though the opium poppy constitutes the largest cash crop in Afghanistan, the 
variety of other tree and plant species found throughout is remarkably broad.  This 
extensive plant variety can be attributed to the diversity of a landscape dominated by 
marginal desert zones, steppe, and rugged mountains.  As with any tree or plant species, 
topography and climactic conditions determine where they will grow and thrive.  In 
particular, the irrigated valleys nestled below the Hindu Kush contain remarkably fertile 
soil that is extraordinarily well-suited for raising agricultural crops and fruit trees, as well 
as for an extensive assortment of wild flowering and berry-producing bushes.  The lower 
valleys are also well-suited for grapes while the Afghan melon, renowned for its sweet 
flavor, thrives at higher elevations.  Additionally, vast orchards of apple, apricot, pear, 
peach, plum, cherry, fig, and pomegranate trees, to name a few, spread across the 
lowlands while almond, walnut, and pistachio trees―considered more hardy and capable 
of thriving with less water―can be found growing in the foothills and rocky escarpments 
at higher elevations.  These orchards and vineyards often have complex and multi-layered 
ownership distributed amongst the male members of a family or even across multiple 
families.   
Usufruct ownership, like that of the orchards, is a fundamental tenant of Afghan 
tribal relations and draws its value from the people-to-people relationships it creates 
among neighboring communities.  “Land rights [and the rights to water resources it 
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contains] are governed by more than one legal regime, including customary law, civil 
law, Islamic law and state law. While important differences exist, there is also an unusual 
degree of commonality among these in their treatment of land rights” (Alden Wiley, 
2003).  Common property such as grazing pastures, forests or water resources are 
generally protected under rawaj, or Afghan customary tribal legal institutions like 
Pashtunwali.  Access and use can be protected under both Qabala-i-urfi (tribal customary 
title deed) and/or Qabala-i-sharayee (official title deed drawn up by local leaders) that 
are generally designed to identify and protect the land and the water resources on it for 
use by those tribal communities living there.  Both forms of ‘title’ can include either 
customary and/or civil law inspired language, Islamic-influenced language or any number 
of amalgams of both.  What has resulted over the last four thousand-plus years is a highly 
complex system of tenure rights that draws upon many local, religious and familial 
influences embodying any variety or combination of customary, civil, and/or Islamic 
legal principles.  The underlining principle behind these types of bottom-up, locally-
based arrangements―which are at their most fundamental premises, attempts to avoid a 
tragedy-of-the-commons―is to ensure that the bargaining power for land tenure is 
situated firmly in the hands of those communities who are directly impacted by its use.  
Certainly this sort of tenure system is not without its conflict but “it promotes efforts that 
can be sustained at the periphery in the hands of ordinary Afghans, operating within local 
and community-level contexts” (Alden Wiley, 2003).  This is fundamentally different 
from capitalism which replaces relationships between people with market value-based 
transactions.   
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Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces share three major river basins (see Figure 4):  
the Sistan River Basin with the Helmand River (the longest river in Afghanistan, 
stretching more than seven-hundred miles) flows towards neighboring Iran in the west; 
the Indus River Basin containing the Kabul River (which boasts twenty-four BCM, the 
highest annual flow in Afghanistan) flows eastward into Pakistan; and the Amu Darya 
River Basin in the northeast with its two major rivers, the Wakhan and Pamir, supply 
water for more than sixty percent of irrigation country-wide before crossing into 
neighboring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Rout, 2008).  The perennial snowpack from the 
Hindu Kush melts and flows from the peaks and down into the surrounding valleys and 
plains below.  More than eighty percent of the water used for agriculture, country-wide, 
traces its origins to the Hindu Kush.  The flow also powers the hydroelectric dams on the 
Kabul river―built by Germany in the 1950s―that generates electricity for more than 
two-thirds of the country.  The Hindu Kush remain completely snow-covered for more 
than half the year and navigating the overland passes; numbering scarcely more than a 
dozen, constitutes an extremely arduous undertaking during the winter months. 
  “There have been a number of large-scale state-sponsored internationally funded 
irrigation schemes in Afghanistan since the 1940s which have had mixed success: the 
Helmand Valley Authority (1952-1965); and the Nangarhar and Baghlan irrigation 
schemes, in the 1960s and more recently in 2008” (to name three) (Lee, 2006).  Among 
these early structural adjustment program initiatives, the US Geological Survey (USGS) 
conducted a lengthy survey in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province between 1952 and 1969 
and concluded that the ‘best’ way to manage the countries freshwater resources was 
through a comprehensive centralization of all Afghan water management procedures.  
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The USGS report also suggested that a “competent organization [must be developed] for 
the collection and analysis of such hydrological data […] for planning drainage, hydro-
power development, flood control measures, and further irrigation development” 
(Westfall, 1969).  Furthermore, the USGS reports overarching objective was to advise the 
Afghan “Ministry of Agriculture (MAI), on procedures and practices in surface-water 
investigations that [would] permit the most rational use of the water resources of the 
country” (Westfall, 1969).   
 
Figure 4: Three major Afghan river basins (boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative) 
 
 “By the late 1970s, five large-scale modern irrigation systems had been built and 
were in operation.  Land tenure was different from traditional systems [and] parts of the 
schemes were operated under private land ownership agreements, while others were 
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operated as State farms ‘owned’ by the government. The Government heavily subsidized 
these schemes and farmers were given very limited choice of crop selection or farming 
practice” (Qureshi, 2002).  These government-run centralized structural adjustment 
schemes were embraced poorly by most traditional Afghan farmers and produced meager 
results until they mostly dissolved after the Soviet invasion in 1979.  It has since been 
estimated that up to fifty percent of the permanent state-funded water delivery 
infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed while its feeble remains struggle to feed a 
paltry twelve percent of those living in rural areas (Qureshi, 2002).  The ‘father-knows-
best’ mindset for Afghan water management that the USGS inaugurated in mid-century 
has continued up through today though a “comprehensive and detailed data base of all 
these projects and programs, how much has been spent, and what has be sustainably 
achieved, unfortunately does not exist” (Qureshi, 2002) (see Table 2 for a sample of 
recent, large-scale internationally funded schemes in Afghanistan and Table 3 for 
examples of successful local water management practices from around the world).   
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Table 2: Sample of recent large-scale internationally-funded water projects 
 
Table 3: Sample of small-scale community-based water initiatives 
In spite of war and widespread destruction of state-funded water delivery 
infrastructure, local freshwater management institutions have effectively managed to 
persevere relatively unencumbered for at least four centuries.  While it is particularly 
important to remember that each community-based freshwater management practice 
varies considerably in physical form, the governing body and purpose remains 
remarkably consistent across cultural and linguistic groups regardless of the community’s 
proximity to the freshwater source or the architecture of the water distribution 
infrastructure.  Moreover, the governing body has remained relatively unchanged for 
millennia.  “Water management in communities, is [generally] organized between 
contiguous clusters of villages that are from the same clan group” (Lee, 2006). The chief 
executives of these local freshwater management institutions are the Mirabs (water 
masters).  Mirabs “share a number of common tasks:  
• To ensure and police the equitable distribution of legal entitlements of in-canal 
and on-farm water.  
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• To supervise and maintain flow in the primary intake as well as in-canal and on-
farm structures.  
• To mobilize resources for and supervise cleaning and repair of canal beds and 
banks.  
• To reconcile disputes between canal irrigators over water sharing issues.  
• To act as mediators between adjacent up and downstream communities who 
share the same water source (usually a river or spring) over water sharing issues.  
• To represent irrigators to district and provincial government” (Lee, 2006).  
 
Mirabs, who are normally elders among their tribe, are chosen by the tribal community to 
adjudicate water related issues and equitable distribution within the community as well as 
with other neighboring communities that share the same freshwater resources―both up 
and downstream.  “The selections [of Mirabs] are mostly conducted with two or three 
candidates, proposed by elders of different villages, located within a community” 
(Abdullaev and Shah, 2011).  As with any election and particularly because water is a 
politically charged topic in the semi-arid country, the competition for Mirab can incite 
conflict and dissent among community members.  The Mirab is therefore accountable to 
the elders and like any elected official (even an informal or ad hoc one such as the Mirab) 
the elders can motion to remove him from his duties if they determine he is not ruling in 
accordance with the best interests of the community.  Recent studies have shown that 
some Mirabs have accepted “bribes to deliver additional water to landowners”, however, 
“community pressure or personal financial distress [may have] motivated these corrupt 
acts” (Dyke, 2008).  Furthermore, some studies have shown that in a few cases, those 
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Mirabs representing communities closer to water sources tend to have larger bargaining 
power than those representing communities situated further away.  Certainly this type of 
pork barrel politics is not confined to Afghan polity.   
As the snow pack melts and the water begins to flow (usually in February or 
March each year), hundreds of members from each village meet―under the supervision 
of the Mirabs―to determine the plans and build the irrigation infrastructure along the 
rivers.  Though relatively simple in its materials (wood, mud and sand), the irrigation 
infrastructure is a marvel of environmental sustainability.  Rather than redirect the natural 
flow of the river, like modern dams or canals, Afghan irrigation canals do not generally 
alter the natural course of the river or stream.  For more than 4,500 years, Afghans have 
relied on an ancient system of hand dug, horizontal tunnels known as karez, for 
delivering important sources of water. “After digging down into the alluvial fans at the 
base of the mountains, the Afghans then [dig] out the horizontal tunnels that carry [water] 
gently downslope from the alluvial fans to basins hundreds to thousands of meters away, 
where the water emerges laterally outward. Length and depth of the tunnels depend upon 
the amount of seasonal rainfall, with wetter areas generally having shorter, shallower 
‘mother wells’” (Williams, 2009). 
In addition to surface water, most community-based freshwater management 
institutions are commonly made up of Qanats, or traditional “underground systems, 
which tap groundwater by gravity from the aquifer[s]”, arhads (shallow wells), sarbands, 
(surface water irrigation canals “traditionally constructed with logs, gravel and 
sandbags”) or any combination of these or other traditional water transport systems 
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(Qureshi, 2002, Rout, 2008).  Many retrieve ground water from the arhads with the help 
of a sakia or Persian wheel (which is normally powered by donkeys, oxen etc.).   
 
Figure 5: Oxen-powered sakia (Persian wheel).  Photo used with permission and courtesy of Muhammad Quresh 
Chapter Five 
This is democracy by the whip and the fear of chains with a whirlwind at its core 
 
―Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban (2012) 
Written from his cell in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; during his four year incarceration 
following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 
 
What happens when someone tries to install a centralized regime in a place like 
Afghanistan?  What is the likelihood that a structural adjustment program will work in 
Afghanistan?  The answer is clear.  Aside from the obvious resistance exhibited by 
Afghans to both past and current programs, a study conducted by Dollar and Svensson 
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(2000) suggested that the US could have predicted the outcome long before embarking on 
the thirteen-year state-building catastrophe.  According to the study (which corroborates 
similar previous analyses (see Rodrik, 1996; Tommasi and Velasco, 1995), a “small 
number of political economy variables can predict the outcome of a [structural] 
adjustment loan successfully seventy-five percent of the time” (emphasis added).  The 
study indicates that one of the most significant variables to impact structural adjustment 
program outcome is the degree to which the population is “highly ethnically fragmented” 
(or ethnic fractionalization).  Structural adjustment programs are less likely to succeed in 
places exhibiting high ethnic diversity than in places with a relatively ethnically 
homogeneous population.  Furthermore, there is a stark contrast between the tenants and 
purposes of Afghan rawaj and the fundamental principles of western capitalism and the 
structural adjustment required for its entrenchment.  It should come as no surprise that 
eliminating local solutions, like usufruct rights or the community-based water 
management practices previously discussed, in favor of centralized control, can cause 
dissent and even conflict.   
Afghans are certainly not the only people on the globe that rely on community-
based water management practices (see Table 3).  Similarly, they are not the only ones to 
have aggressively resisted state or international structural adjustment programs to that 
end.  In fact, a remarkably similar circumstance―right on American soil―can be found 
in the not-too-distant past.  The manner by which the US sought to resolve this issue and 
the resultant policy can serve as a remarkable model for constructing a similar 
arrangement in Afghanistan.   
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For the last four-hundred years, the acequias in New Mexico have enjoyed a 
similar arrangement and have just as fervently opposed outside intervention into their 
customary local water management practices.  Derived from the Arabic term assaquiya; 
acequias is Spanish for ‘irrigation canal’ and also refers to the “association of members 
organized around them” (Crawford, 2006).  “The [native peoples] of the Southwest have 
carried on agricultural operations with the aid of irrigation for centuries [and] and their 
irrigation systems were built and managed as community affairs” (Hutchins, 1928).  
Historically speaking, access to and utilization of these community-based water 
management systems were free to all local inhabitants while ‘legislation’ and oversight 
was maintained by local officials.  Moreover, infrastructure maintenance was conducted 
by the community.  “Many acequias had been built in the territory acquired by [the US] 
from Mexico [and the US federal government initially ruled that the] laws theretofore in 
force concerning water courses should continue in force, except that regulation of these 
matters should be transferred from the village ayuntamientos to the alcaldes and prefects 
of the several counties” (Hutchins, 1928).  Soon thereafter, the US government codified a 
series of laws in the 1850s, 1880s and 1890s that were intended to forego community 
oversight in favor of regulation by county courts and state legislative commissioners.  
These laws also included legal provisions for “regulat[ing] the amount of labor to be 
performed by landowners” and for withholding use of the acequias to “delinquent 
landowners” (Hutchins, 1928).  “Yet, in the enactment and judicial construction of the 
truly modern irrigation laws of New Mexico the time-honored practices and customs of 
community acequias [were] jealously safeguarded” and many communities successfully 
lobbied for amendments to these laws that would allow them to continue their traditional 
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water management practices unencumbered and revert to local community management 
as it had been for the last four-hundred years (Hutchins, 1928).   
 
Conclusion  
Blood is thicker than water 
Over the last thirteen years, answering the question of how to unite the people of 
Afghanistan under a single political institution has left academics, political analysts and 
presidents scratching their heads.  Meanwhile, Afghan civilians from all tribal, ethnic and 
linguistic groups are rightfully disillusioned and cynical about the gains their western 
guests keep promising.  The ever-elusive ‘peaceful democracy’ in Afghanistan is rather 
more a question of incompatibility with the long trusted US democratization model— a 
model that has been employed with oft lauded but altogether uninspiring results in a host 
of countries over the last 100 years.  While there is often disconnect between theory and 
practice in state-building, the leave-your-baggage-at-the-door state-building model 
preferred by western scholars and statesmen―devised as a means to transcend culture 
and ethnicity―is particularly well suited for creating political monopolies, intensifying 
divisions and increasing inter-sectarian conflict.   
Current research from McGarry and O’Leary and Cedarman et al. suggests that 
ethnofederalism with consociational power sharing is a viable alternative to the popular 
theory of centripetalism and assimilation when considering state-building in places with 
high ethnic and cultural diversity.  Similarly, research from Dollar and Svensson 
corroborates theories that suggest structural adjustment programs designed to pool power 
and control over natural resources are more likely to fail in places with a high degree of 
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ethnic and cultural diversity. The US state-building model which predominantly features 
the latter has yielded lackluster results in a host of countries including Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Afghan tribal communities have vehemently resisted foreign forces bent on 
assimilation for as far back as written history stretches and there is no reason to assume 
they will change their minds―especially considering the current quagmire prevailing 
there today. Afghans have been historically autonomy-seeking and have found ingenious 
and environmentally sustainable ways to manage freshwater resources while 
simultaneously fostering inter-community relations. Through a system of interconnected 
personal relations, Afghans have maintained strong ethnic and cultural ties to their 
ancestors despite incessant war and continued assimilation efforts by western powers. 
The community-based water management practices and the Mirabs who oversee them are 
remarkable examples of local governance and community centered politics at its best. 
They can also serve as the foundation for an enthnofederlist polity. 
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